Andrew M. Toft
Attorney at Law
216 16th Street, Suite 1210
Denver, CO 80202
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Phone: (303) 436-0980
Phone: (303) 895-8998
Fax: (303) 436-0983

Legal News

News

Litigation Real Estate

Litigation

[02/03] World court upholds German immunity in Nazi cases
[02/01] $19.5M asbestos settlement proposed by W.R. Grace
[02/01] Lawyers in NY Facebook suit spar over fee amount
[02/01] FTC: phone card scam leads to $2.3M settlement

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Real Estate

[02/02] Preferred Apartment Communities, Inc. Increases Quarterly Dividend
[02/02] Apartment Industry Continues Recovery, Survey Says
[02/02] MFA Financial, Inc. to Present at Credit Suisse Financial Services Forum
[02/02] PulteGroup Reports Financial Results for 2011 Fourth Quarter

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Case Summaries

Banking Law Commercial Law Uniform Commercial Code

Banking Law

[02/01] GECCMC 2005-C1 Plummer Street Office L.P. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
In a suit alleging breach of lease agreements that the defendant bank assumed after it purchased a failed bank's assets and liabilities from the FDIC pursuant to the terms of a written purchase and assumption agreement, the district court's grant of the bank's motion to dismiss is affirmed, where under federal common law, the plaintiff lacked standing to bring suit under the agreement because it was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the agreement.

[01/24] TIFD III-E, Inc. v. US
In a suit by a taxpayer partner challenging IRS notices of adjustment reallocating a large percentage of the partnership's income for the years 1993 to 1998 to the taxpayer away from two Dutch banks that had purchased an interest in the partnership, and imposing a penalty for underpayment, the district court's judgment in favor of the taxpayer is reversed, where: 1) the banks' interest was not a capital interest for purposes of qualifying them as partners within the meaning of IRC section 704(e)(1); and 2) the taxpayer failed to point to substantial authority supporting its position, so that the government was entitled to impose a penalty on the taxpayer for substantial understatement of income.

[01/20] CRM Collateral II, Inc. v. TriCounty Metropolitan Transportation Dist. of Oregon
In proceedings following default on a standby letter of credit, the district court's disposition of the case on cross-motions for summary judgment is reversed and the case remanded, where: 1) the district court incorrectly concluded that the applicant for the letter of credit was a surety and erroneously permitted it to assert the defense of discharge; and 2) the applicant was not entitled to an award of damages because the beneficiary's draw on the letter of credit did not violate the statutory warranty to the applicant that the drawing did not violate any agreement between the applicant and the beneficiary.

[01/06] Vegas Diamond Properties, LLC v. FDIC
In an appeal from a judgment of the district court dissolving a Temporary Restraining Order on the ground that the anti-injunction provision of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act precluded it from enjoining the FDIC from conducting a trustee's sale of certain real properties, appeal is dismissed as moot where the subject properties were sold prior to appeal.

[12/29] Balderas v. Countrywide Bank, NA
In an appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the plaintiffs' Truth In Lending Act complaint, judgment is reversed where the complaint contained allegations that, if proven, presents a winning case, and thus the district court erred in dismissing the action however remote plaintiffs' ultimate success may be.

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Commercial Law

[02/01] In re American Express Merchants' Litigation
In a class action asserting Sherman Act claims, brought against a charge card issuer whose card acceptance agreement purported to preclude a merchant from bringing a class action lawsuit, the district court's grant of the defendant's motion to compel arbitration and dismissal of the case is reversed, where the cost of plaintiffs' individually arbitrating their dispute with the defendant would be prohibitive, effectively depriving them of the statutory protections of the antitrust laws, and thus the class action waiver in the arbitration provision was unenforceable.

[01/27] C9 Ventures v. SVC-West, L.P.
In a personal injury suit in which a lessor of helium-filled tanks used to inflate festive balloons cross-complained against the lessee to enforce an indemnification provision on the back of an unsigned invoice, the trial court's judgment in favor of the lessor and award of attorney fees to it is reversed, where: 1) the lessee did not manifest assent to the terms on the back of the unsigned invoice by course of dealing or course of performance, or under basic contract law; 2) the lessee did not sign the invoice or otherwise expressly agree to its terms; 3) an unsigned invoice itself is not a contract, and repeated delivery of a particular form does not make the form part of the parties' agreement; 4) payment of the invoice merely constituted the lessee's performance of the obligation under the oral contract to pay for the rental of the helium-filled tanks; and 5) assuming the transaction was a sale of goods covered by division 2 of the California Commercial Code, the indemnification provision was not an additional term of the contract under section 2207 of the Commercial Code.

[01/24] Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A. Inc.
In a putative class action against a men's clothing retailer alleging that its printing of “EXPIRY: 04/##” on a credit card receipt willfully violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA)'s prohibition against printing the expiration date of the a credit card upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale, the district court's grant of the defendant's motion to dismiss is affirmed, where: 1) FACTA prohibits a merchant from printing expiration date information on a receipt provided to the consumer, even if the year is redacted; but 2) the defendant's interpretation of FACTA, although erroneous, was at least objectively reasonable, and thus there was no "willful" violation that could support a claim.

[01/24] Mabey Bridge & Shore, Inc. v. Schoch
In a suit by a corporation engaged in the business of supplying temporary steel bridges for construction projects, seeking a declaration that the Pennsylvania Steel Products Procurement Act, as interpreted and enforced by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), is unconstitutional, and requesting a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining PennDOT from prohibiting the use of the company's temporary bridges on its projects, the district court's grant of summary judgment against the company on all its claims is affirmed, where: 1) the state Steel Act was not preempted by the federal Buy America Act and related federal regulations; 2) the Steel Act is not unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause; 3) PennDOT's actions did not violate the Contract Clause; and 4) PennDOT's application of the Steel Act did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

[01/20] Khan v. Dell Inc.
On a motion to compel arbitration brought by a defendant computer manufacturer in a case alleging design defects brought as a putative consumer class action by a purchaser, the district court's judgment denying the motion is vacated and the case remanded, where: 1) the arbitration agreement in the purchase contract did not indicate the parties' unambiguous intent not to arbitrate their disputes if the named arbitrator was unavailable; and 2) Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act requires a court to address such unavailability by appointing a substitute arbitrator.

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Uniform Commercial Code

[06/25] BRASHER'S CASCADE AUTO AUCTION v. VALLEY AUTO SALES AND LEASING
The former version of the California Uniform Commercial Code requires a merchant buyer to adhere to reasonable commercial standards to obtain the status of a buyer in the ordinary course of business for purposes of section 9307.

[05/26] PROPULSION TECHS. v. ATWOOD CORP.
An agreement to manufacture boat parts is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds as a transaction in goods with no ascertainable quantity term, thus the claim for fraud in the inducement cannot survive.

[04/12] CHATSKY & ASSOCS. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY (BANK OF AM. CORP.)
The one-year limitations period of Code of Civil Procedure section 340(c), rather than the three-year limitations period of California Uniform Commercial Code section 4111, applies to claims by depositors against their bank for payment of forged checks written on the depositors' accounts.

[01/22] HICKS v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY (KAUFMAN & BROAD HOME CORP.)
If set forth in conspicuous and understandable language, a disclaimer of the implied warranty of quality is enforceable. The trial court correctly concluded that written disclaimers in the sales and express warranty documents provided to the home buyers preclude their claim for breach of implied warranty.

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